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Abstract
We provide a theory of trading through intermediaries in OTC markets. The role
of intermediaries is to sustain trade, when trade is benecial. In our model, traders
are connected through a network. Agents observe their neighborsactions, and can
trade with their counterparty in a given period through a path of intermediaries in
the network. However, agents can renege on their obligations. We show that trading
through a network is essential to support trade, when agents infrequently meet the
same counteparty in the market. However, intermediaries must receive fees to have
the incentive to implement trades. Concentrated intermediation, as represented by a
star network, is both a constrained e¢ cient and a stable structure, when agents incur
linking costs. Moreover, the center agent in a star can receive higher fees as well.
Keywords: over-the-counter trading; strategic default; dynamic network forma-
tion.
JEL: D85; G14; G21.
Email addresses: anababus@gmail.com, t-hu@kellogg.northwestern.edu. We are grateful to Gadi Bar-
levy, Je¤ Campbell, Doug Diamond, Kinda Hachem, Alessandro Pavan, Adriano Rampini, Asher Wolinsky
and numerous seminar participants. The views in this paper are solely those of the authors and not the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.
1 Introduction
Many nancial transactions take place in over-the-counter (OTC) markets where counter-
parties can choose whom they trade with. Often, markets participants develop long-lived
trading relationships. For instance, Afonso, Kovner and Schoar (2014) nd evidence that
participants in the Fed Funds market frequently choose to interact with the same counter-
party over time. Moreover, in various markets a relatively small group of dealers interme-
diate persistently the majority of trades. This concentrated intermediation structure has
been documented in markets for CDS contracts (Du¢ e, Scheicher and Vuillemey, 2015),
muni bonds (Li and Schürho¤, 2014), or securitized products (Hollield, Neklyudov and
Spatt, 2014). These regularities lead to questions about the role of intermediation and its
connection to relationship trading in OTC markets.
This paper addresses these questions by proposing a theory of endogenous intermedia-
tion in OTC markets. In particular, we study the impact of trading through a network of
intermediaries on the e¢ ciency of trade, in an environment with limited commitment and
limited information about agentspast actions. Intermediaries in our model can alleviate
these frictions and sustain (unsecured) trade. However, intermediaries a¤ect the division
of the surplus. We show that intermediaries must be compensated to ensure they have
the incentive to implement trades. The share of surplus that accrues to intermediaries is
endogenously determined by incentive compatibility, and depends on the network struc-
ture. Our main results state that star networks, in which one agent intermediates all
transactions, are both constrained e¢ cient and stable structures in large economies, even
as traders incur small linking costs.
To study relationship trading, we consider a dynamic setting in which agents trade
bilaterally. At each date half of the agents have liquidity surpluses and half have investment
opportunities. An agent with a liquidity surplus is randomly paired with an agent with an
investment opportunity at each period. The liquidity agent is endowed with one unit of
cash that may be lent to the paired investment agent to nance his investment opportunity,
whose return depends on the amount of the borrowing.
In this environment, we consider two frictions. First, we assume that there is limited
commitment, and that agents can renege on due payments at the end of the period. This
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friction captures the fact that agents in nancial markets can strategically default and
benet from it at the expense of their counterparties. For instance, in the Fed funds
market banks can delay the delivery of overnight loaned funds until the afternoon hours,
while in the repo markets agents strategically postpone both the delivery of the collateral
(failure to deliver) and repaying the loan (failure to receive).1 More generally, agents can
use the funds borrowed to engage in excessive risk taking activities that would preclude
them from repaying their debts.
Second, we consider that agents have limited access to information about other agents
past behavior. This assumption is motivated by the fact that, while OTC markets are
opaque and information about the terms of trade is not public, nancial institutions may
nevertheless have access to soft information about their long-term trading partners.2 In
particular, we consider that traders are connected through an informational network that
allows each agent to observe the repayments that his neighbors make.
In the presence of limited commitment, agents have to rely on self-enforcing contracts to
implement trades. In particular, repayments may be enforced if agents can be threatened
with exclusion from the market in case they default on their obligations. The information
observed through the network allows agents to implement such threats. For this, however,
transactions must take place through intermediaries in the network. Unless contracts are
self-enforcing, trade breaks down.3
We obtain three sets of results. The rst set highlights the role of intermediaries in
sustaining trade. We start by showing that trade is not sustainable in large economies
in which no agent is linked to any other agent. At the same time, we show that a star
network can sustain trade, no matter how large the number of market participants is.
However, the center agent in the star must be compensated to ensure he has the incentive to
intermediate trades. In particular, since the center agent transfers funds between liquidity
1Bartolini, Hilton and McAndrews (2010) document settlement delays in the money market, while
Gorton and Muir (2015) present evidence of fails in repo markets.
2For instance, Du et al. (2015) show that participants in the CDS market choose their counterparties
based on their risk prole.
3A credit bureau that collects and makes credit records public can make intermediaries redundant.
However, there are signicant di¢ culties associated with creating such institution. Typically, nancial
market participants are reluctant to disclose to regulators not only information about themselves, but
also information about their counterparties. Indeed, nancial institutions see putting a counterparty into
default as a very serious step.
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and investment agents, he must receive appropriate fees to overcome the temptation to
retain the funds for himself. The fees in our model are endogenously determined by
incentive compatibility. The incentive compatibility constraint for agents who use the
intermediation service sets an upper bound for the fees the center agent receives, while
the incentive compatibility constraint for the center agent himself sets a lower bound. In
addition, by comparing di¤erent network structure we highlight the relative advantage
that network positions o¤er some agents over others. We nd that the center agent in a
star network can receive a higher fee than any intermediary in other classes of networks
we study.
The second set of results focuses on welfare improvements that trading through a
network can bring in the presence of linking costs. When taking linking costs into account,
maximizing expected welfare involves a trade-o¤. On the one hand, a higher level of
investment increases welfare. On the other hand, a network that implements a high level
of investment may involve a higher linking cost. We show that the star network is a
constrained e¢ cient network when it can sustain a level of investment su¢ ciently close to
the rst-best, provided that the linking costs are not too high and that the market size is
large.
The third set of results concerns network formation and stability, when agents incur
linking costs. In particular, we investigate whether agents have an incentive to participate
in a network and identify structures that are stable when traders are allowed to change
their links. We propose a dynamic network formation game, and introduce an appropriate
stability concept. We show that a star network is stable.
Although stylized, our results are consistent with the observed features of OTC markets
we have described above. In our set-up, a star network is both stable and constrained
e¢ cient. This is consistent with observations about the pattern of trades in OTC markets.
For instance, Li and Schürho¤ (2014) show that nearly 80% of the trades are intermediated
by only one dealer, with the remainder involving longer intermediation chains. For our
results, we concentrate on characterizing equilibria in which all trades take place without
collateral. Since we do not aim to make quantitative statements, this simplies the analysis
without losing insights. However, while in some markets, such as the Fed Funds market,
trade is unsecured, this is not always the case. In Section 5 we discuss an extension
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of our model in which transactions are collateralized. Moreover, our insights can be
readily transferred into a more realistic but less tractable model that allows for partial
collateralization in transactions.
Related Literature
This paper relates to several strands of literature. The more relevant studies are those on
intermediation in OTC markets, trading in networks and contract enforcement.
A series of papers, starting with Du¢ e, Garleanu and Pedersen (2005), has studied
trading in OTC markets. While initially these studies have been concerned with explaining
asset prices through trading frictions, several recent additions to the literature are inter-
ested in the role of intermediaries in OTC markets. Hugonnier, Lester and Weill (2014),
Neklyudov (2014) and Chang and Zhang (2015) propose models in which intermediaries
facilitate trade between counterparties that otherwise would need to wait a long time to
trade. In our model, agents also trade through intermediaries to overcome frictions that
arise from search. However, our focus is on informational frictions, as is in Glode and Opp
(2015) and Fainmesser (2014). While in the rst paper the role of intermediaries is to
reduce adverse selection and restore e¢ cient trading, in the second one intermediaries can
informally enforce the repayment of loans by borrowers, as in our model. In these studies,
however, intermediaries are exogenously determined. In contrast, in our model, certain
agents endogenously assume the role of intermediaries to facilitate repeated interactions
between traders in the market. Di Maggio and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015) show that inter-
mediaries can alleviate moral hazard problems in the economy if trade is collateralized.
However, the intermediation capacity is bounded when there are collateral shortages. We
show that intermediaries can alleviate ine¢ ciencies in OTC markets even if such a case
were to arise. In addition, we allow agents to choose how to form links and analyze which
networks are stable.
There is a growing literature that studies trading in nancial networks (e.g. Colla and
Mele, 2010, Ozsoylev and Walden, 2011, Babus and Kondor, 2013, Zawadowski, 2013,
Gofman (2014), Malamud and Rostek, 2014). These papers typically model trades that
take place either sequentially or in a spot market. Either way, trading relationships are
not considered. In contrast, the role of repeated interactions is at the core of our analysis.
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The literature on contract enforcement is substantial. The general aim of this literature
is to show that repeated interactions alleviate problems that arise when there is limited
enforcement of contracts. Allen and Gale (1999) propose a model where two parties
that interact repeatedly can implement the rst-best contract, even though contracts are
incomplete. Other papers depart from the assumption that the same two parties interact
with each other, and consider a large population of agents that are matched at random
to interact every period. In this case, whether contracts can be enforced or not depends
crucially on how much information is available to each agent. Greif (1993) and Tirole
(1996) propose an enforcement mechanism based on community reputation, while Klein
and Le­ er (1981) rely on costless communication between consumers to enforce that
rms supply products of high quality to the market. In this paper we also study whether
it is possible to enforce rst-best contracts through repeated interactions when agents are
randomly matched to trade. However, in our model agents have access to information via
a network of bilateral relationships. We provide conditions under which agents rely on
the network to trade the e¢ cient contracts. In addition, we allow agents to choose how
to form these relationships and analyze which networks structures are stable.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model set-up. In
Section 3 we describe in detail the trading protocol and analyze when unsecured trade
is implementable, as well as the e¢ ciency of trading through networks. We propose con-
cepts for network formation and show which networks are stable in Section 4. Section 6
concludes.
2 The Environment
Time is discrete and has an innite horizon. A set of agents, N = f1; :::; 2ng, participate
in the market at each date t. All agents are risk-neutral, innitely lived, and discount
the future with the discount factor  = 1=(1 + ), where  is the discount rate. At the
beginning of each period, uniformly at random, half of the agents are assigned a liquidity
surplus, and the other half are assigned an investment opportunity. Let Lt be the set of
agents with liquidity surpluses in period t (henceforth, liquidity agents), and It be the
set of agents with investment opportunities in period t (henceforth, investment agents).
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A liquidity agent is endowed with one unit of cash, which can be stored at no cost until
the end of the period. An investment agent has an opportunity to invest in an asset
that matures at the end of the period. The investment in the asset is scalable: if an
amount q 2 [0; 1] is invested, the asset yields a return R(q). We assume that R is strictly
increasing, strictly concave, twice di¤erentiable with R0(1)  1 and R(0) = 0.
To exploit the investment opportunity, an investment agent i 2 It needs to borrow
funds from some liquidity agent ` 2 Lt at the beginning of each period, t. Typically, in
OTC markets parties trade customized contracts. To capture this feature, we assume that
once agents have been assigned a type (liquidity or investment), liquidity and investment
agents are matched uniformly at random, and each investment agent can borrow only from
the liquidity agent he is matched with. The debt must be repaid at the end of the period.
Formally, a matchingmt is a subset of LtIt such that for each liquidity agent ` 2 Lt,
there is a unique investment agent i 2 It for which the pair mt = (`; i) 2 mt. At each
date t, a matching mt is randomly drawn from the set of all possible matches at date t.
The probability that a pair of agents (k; k0) 2 N N is matched at date t is then4
Pr[
 
k; k0
 2mt] = 1
2(2n  1) :
For the remainder of the paper, we refer to a pair of agents before any uncertainty is
realized as (k; k0), and to a matched pair of liquidity and investment agents as (`; i).
In this environment, we consider two frictions. First, we assume that there is limited
commitment, and that agents can renege on obligations at the end of the period.5 Sec-
ond, we consider that agents have limited access to information about other agentspast
behavior. In particular, we consider that agents are connected through an informational
network that allows each agent to observe the unilateral actions that his neighbors take.
A network, gt, is a graph (N ; E t), where N is the set of nodes, and E t  N N is the set
of links that exist between agents at date t. The set of agents who have a link with agent
k in the network gt, or, the set of agent ks neighbors, is denoted by N tk. The information
4This is because the probability that k is a liquidity agent is 1
2
. Then, conditional on being a liquidity
agent, the probability that he is matched with k0 as an investment agent is 1=(2n  1).
5 In our environment agents do not have collateral to secure trades. We discuss collateralized trades in
Section 5.
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that agents observe is described in detail in Section 3.1.
Trade may break down in the presence of limited commitment. To counteract this
problem agents can use the information they access through the network and trade (with-
out collateral) by relying on self-enforcing contracts. In particular, agents have the option
to trade through the informational network. Given a network gt and a realization of
the matching mt, the pairs that are matched at date t may or may not be connected
by a link. If a matched pair (`; i) has a link in the network gt, they can trade directly
through their link. If a matched pair (`; i) does not have a link in the network gt, they
can trade through a path of intermediaries. A path of intermediaries between a pair
(k; k0) 2 N  N in a network gt is a sequence of agents (j1; j2; :::; jv) such that the links
(k; j1); (j1; j2); :::; (jv; k
0) 2 E t. We use Pt (k; k0) to denote the set of paths from k to k0 in
the network gt, and Pt(k; k0) to denote a generic path. Similarly, once the matching mt is
realized, we use Pt
 
mt

to denote the set of paths that can be used to intermediate trade
between a matched pair mt = (`; i), and Pt(mt) to denote a generic path. The trading
protocol is described in detail in Section 3.1. The network has, thus, both a trading and
an informational function.
Links in the network are costly. In particular, each agent, k, incurs a linking cost for
each link he has in the network that has two components: a recurrent component, cl, that
is paid every period, and an idiosyncratic component, cm, that is paid only in the periods
in which the link is used in a transaction. A link can be used in a transaction when it
connects a pair of matched agents, or when it connects agents that intermediate trade
between a matched pair. Thus, the total cost that an agent pays in any given period t
depends not only on his position in the network, but also on the realized matching mt
and the path of intermediaries used to trade. The motivation behind the structure of
the linking costs is related to the two functions that a network has. The idiosyncratic
component, cm, can be interpreted as a transaction cost, while the recurrent component,
cl, can be interpreted as a cost to access information, or informational cost.
We study when the rst-best allocation can be decentralized, and characterize second-
best outcomes as well.
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3 The (Repeated) Trading Game
In this section we take the network g = (N ; E) as xed for all periods.6 We analyze the
set of nancial contracts for which trade takes place, if the level of investment is q 2 [0; 1].
The level of investment, q, is dened as the amount that each investment agent borrows
from the liquidity agent with whom he is matched, and invests in the asset.
We begin by specifying the contracts and the trading game, and dene strategies and
equilibrium. We characterize the level of investment that is implementable in equilibrium.
Then, we proceed to analyze the e¢ ciency of nancial networks.
3.1 Financial Contracts and Trading Procedure
For each investment level q, the terms of trade between a matched pair is determined by
a nancial contract which has two components. The rst component species an amount,
d 2 [q;R(q)], that an investment agent should repay a liquidity agent with whom he is
matched in exchange for borrowing q units of funds. The second component species a
fee f 2 R+ that intermediaries can receive. More precisely, if a pair (k; k0) is matched and
trade through a path P(k; k0) = (j1; j2; :::; jv), then the investment agent should repay in
total d+
Pv
s=1 f , such that an intermediary js receives f , for any s = 1; :::; v.
The nancial contract, (d; f), is independent of the position of the agents in the net-
work. An agents position in the network is only reected in the total payo¤ he expects to
receive in a given period. However, a crucial feature of our analysis is that the nancial
contract depends on the network structure g. By comparing di¤erent network structure
we highlight the relative advantage that network positions o¤er some agents over others.
We also allow the nancial contract to depend on the level of investment, q.
In the presence of limited commitment, the incentive of intermediaries to transfer the
repayments to the next agent depends on the future benets they expect to receive from
trade. In particular, an agent with a liquidity surplus who is an intermediary may nd
it optimal to keep the repayments for himself, without the expectation of receiving fees
in the future. The fees in the nancial contracts have then to be adequately designed to
deter the incentives of the intermediaries to renege on their obligations, with respect to
6 In Section 4 we relax this assumption and analyze issues related to network formation and stability.
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the information obtained from the network.
The trading procedure at date t, is given as follows. First each agent is assigned a type
(liquidity or investment), and the matching mt realizes. These realizations are common
knowledge among all agents.
Then, for each matched pair mt = (`; i) 2mt, the investment agent i proposes a path
P(mt) = (j1; j2; :::; jv) through which to trade with `. We allow the investment agent i to
propose the empty path, that is, to propose to trade directly with ` even if they dont have
a link, and circumvent the intermediaries given by the network g. We assume that this
proposal is common knowledge to all agents. Each agent on the path then sequentially
responds with an yes or no, starting from j1 and ending with `. If all agents on the path
respond with yes, then trade takes place and the liquidity agent, `, transfers q units of
cash to the investment agent, i, through the path. Otherwise, there is no trade between
the matched pair mt along the proposed path.
If trade takes place, each agent on the path has a debt obligations to the next one
according to the nancial contract, (d; f), as follows. The agent i is obligated to repay
[d+ v  f ] to j1. Further, each intermediary jv0 is supposed to receive [d+ (v   s0 + 1)]
from js0 1 and is obligated to repay [d+ (v   s0)  f ] to js0+1, with j0 = i and jv+1 = `.
After the investment realizes its payo¤, each agent on the path decides whether he
repays his debt obligation. The decision depends on both the agents willingness to repay
and the resources that are available to him. In particular, an intermediary may not have
su¢ cient resources to honor his obligations if the agents before him on the path do not
honor theirs. In what follows we assume that an agent either repays in full or repays
nothing. This assumption will simplify our notation without losing any insights.
If there is no trade, the liquidity agent retains the unit of cash and the opportunity to
invest is foregone. Intermediaries receive no fees on the path P(mt).
Next, we describe the information structure in detail. As we discussed earlier, an
agent j can observe each of his neighborsunilateral actions, as well as information that
is common knowledge, which includes the realized types of the agents, the matching, and
the proposed paths by each investment agent. For each agent k, his unilateral actions in
the network g at date t, denoted by atk, include the following elements: (i) his responses on
the proposed trading paths that he is involved; (ii) whether he repays in full to each of his
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neighbors, if he is either an intermediary and/or an agent with an investment opportunity.
If an agent repays directly to agents other than his neighbors, his action is not observed
by his neighbors. Let atk =
 
a0k; :::; a
t
k

be the unilateral actions taken by agent k up to
date t, and let at0 =
 
a00; :::; a
t
0

be the commonly known information up to date t. Then,
the history that an agent k observes at date t is given by htk =
n
atj : (j; k) 2 E
o
[ fat0g.
Because an agent may be involved in multiple trading paths, we need to specify a timing
for their responses and repayments. For each proposed trading path P = (j1; j2; :::; jv)
between a matched pair m = (i; `), agents in position j1 respond simultaneously rst,
then agents in position j2, etc. Similarly, for repayment decisions, investment agents
decide rst simultaneously, and then agents in position j1, depending on the resources
repaid by investment agents, and then agents in position j2, etc.
Next we introduce strategies and the equilibrium concept. First we dene strategies.
For each agent k, his strategy in period t, denoted by stk, has three components:
 st;1k maps the history ht 1k he observes, the realization of agentstype, and the match-
ing mt to a proposed path, if he is an investment agent;
 st;2k maps the history ht 1k he observes, the commonly known information at0, and the
responses of his neighbors before him on the paths that involve him to his responses,
if he is a liquidity agent and/or an intermediary;
 st;3k maps the history ht 1k he observes, the commonly known information at0, and
the repayments of his neighbors before him on the paths that involve him to his
repayment decisions on all trading paths he is involved, if he is an investment agent
and/or an intermediary. Note that his repayment decision is constrained by repay-
ment decisions of agents before him on the trading paths.
We use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) as the solution concept. We restrict
attention to equilibria that satisfy the following properties.
(A1) No default. Every agent consents to trade according to the contract (d; f) and
there is no default in equilibrium plays.
(A2) Shortest path. The shortest paths in the network g are always proposed in equilib-
rium. When there are multiple shortest path between a matched pair, they are proposed
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with equal probabilities in equilibrium.
(A3) Stationary equilibrium allocation. The level of investment, q, is constant across
realized matches and across periods.
Denition 1 A PBE equilibrium satisfying (A1)-(A3) is called a simple equilibrium.
Condition (A1) is a symmetry requirement, as it rules out the possibility that only
a subset of agents trade. Similar considerations motivate condition (A3). Condition
(A2) requires that the equilibrium trading paths are the shortest ones. This assumption
simplies our analysis, since in general networks multiple paths may be used to trade, but
only the shortest one minimizes the expected transaction cost, cm.
3.2 Implementation and Constrained E¢ ciency
In this section we characterize contracts that can be implemented in equilibrium and
analyze their welfare properties. We conclude the sections by with some observations
about the compensation that intermediaries receive.
3.2.1 Contract implementation
We start by exploring the role of networks in supporting trade in equilibrium. We rst de-
scribe how the gains from trade depend on the level of investment q. We then characterize
the investment level, q, that is implementable in a given network g. Focusing on the level
of investment, q, provides a rich metric to di¤erentiate across those network structures in
which trade can be sustained.
Denition 2 A level of investment, q, is implementable in a network g if it is supported
in a simple equilibrium for some associated nancial contract (d; f).
Abstracting from linking and transaction costs, trade is always benecial. In particular,
when all matched pairs trade and the level of investment is q, then the average surplus
generated at each date is
 (q) = R (q)  q: (1)
Since the return R () is strictly concave and increasing, the condition R0(1)  1 ensures
that  () is increasing in q 2 [0; 1] with  (q) > 0 for all q 2 (0; 1]. The gains from
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trade are maximized when q = 1. This implies that q = 1 represents the rst-best level of
investment.
Although trade generates a positive surplus, it is not necessarily the case that it can
be supported in equilibrium. Even in the least restrictive case of complete information,
when all histories are publicly observable, trade can be supported in equilibrium for an
investment level q if and only if7
q  1
2
 (q) : (2)
The intuition is simple. Agents weigh the long-term benet from participating in the
market against the one time gain of retaining all the return of the asset and paying 0. In
particular, when an investment agent decides whether to repay at the end of the period,
he takes into consideration he will be excluded from the market at all future dates as an
investment agent, if he defaults on his obligations.
When there is incomplete information, condition (2) is no longer su¢ cient. In this
case, the frequency with which an agent trades with a counterparty a¤ects his incentives
to default on his obligations. As we show below, networks may implement an investment
level q for which there are positive gains from trade, particularly when the number of
market participants grows large.
To understand the role of networks in supporting trade, we rst explore the empty
network benchmark. In an empty network, no agent is linked to any other agent. In
this case, once the agents type has been assigned and the matching has been realized,
an investment agent can only propose to trade directly (i.e. the empty path) with the
liquidity agent he has been matched with. The liquidity agent can then respond either
yes or no. No agent intermediates trades. Aside from the information that is common
knowledge, each agent observes only the action of his counterparty at a given date t. Note
that this trading procedure is a special case of the trading procedure described in Section
3.1. The following lemma characterizes the level of investment that is implementable in
the empty network.
7We do not provide a proof for this statement, as the result is standard.
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Lemma 1 Let agents trade in an empty network.
(i) A level of investment, q, is implementable if
q  1
2(2n  1) (q) : (3)
(ii) For any level of investment q > 0, there exists n such that q is not implementable
for all n  n.
The lemma shows that the level of investment that is implementable when no informa-
tion (other than agentsown past trades) is observable depends on how large the economy
is. This is because the market size a¤ects how likely it is that two counterparties who
trade at date t, meet again in a given future period. When n grows large, the probability
of meeting the same agent in future periods is small. Thus, if an agent defaults on his
current obligation but repays in future trades with other counterparties, the threat that
he will not trade when he meets his date-t counterparty again is not binding as n grows
large. Hence, he cannot overcome his temptation to default. As a result, when the market
size increases, no level of investment is implementable in an empty network, even though
there may be positive gains from trade.8
In a stark contrast with the empty network is the level of investment implementable
in a star network, which we characterize next. A network is a star if there exists an agent
kC such that
E = f(kC ; j) : j 2 N ; j 6= kg:
We refer to agent kC in a star network the center agent. All other agents in the star
network are periphery agents. A star network with 2n agents is denoted gn. Figure 1(a)
illustrates a star network.
When analyzing implementation in networks, such as the star or more general struc-
tures, linking costs also a¤ect agentsincentives to make repayments. In particular, the
8Lemma 1 also implies that the trading procedure we consider, in which each matched pair trades
through the network, is without loss of generality. Recall that, in a network, an agents repayment to
agents other than his neighbors is not observed by his neighbors. In particular, we cannot implement
unsecured trades in which an investment agent repays directly to the liquidty agent he is matched with
and who is not his neighbor, when n is su¢ ciently large.
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Figure 1: This gure illustrates two types of networks with the same number of agents.
Panel (a) shows a star network. Panel (b) illustrates an inter-linked star network.
transaction cost, cm, is consequential, since an agent incurs it for each of his links that is
used to trade in a given period. In contrast, the agent incurs the informational cost, cl, for
each of his links every period, and hence it does not a¤ect his repayment decision. While
only transaction costs play a role in implementation, both costs inuence signicantly
welfare and the stability of networks, as discussed later.
To characterize equilibria in networks for the remainder of the paper, we restrict our
attention to nancial contracts with the property that d  q+ cm. We use this restriction
for simplicity, as it ensures that the liquidity agent is willing to lend to the investment
agent through the network, provided that he believes that his counterparties will repay
their debts. No insights are lost if we relax the assumption.
The next proposition characterizes the levels of investment that can be implemented
under a star network.
Proposition 1 Let agents trade in a star network gn. Then, a level of investment, q, is
implementable if
(q + cm) + 2cm  1
1=2 + 

 (q + cm) + 1
2
(q)  cm

: (4)
Proposition 1 provides a su¢ cient condition for a star network to implement a given
level of investment q, that is independent of the number of market participants. Thus,
even as n grows large, agents can still trade as long as the level of investment q satises
(4).
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We obtain condition (4) by ensuring that both center and periphery agents have the
incentive to repay their obligations. Consider rst the incentives of a periphery agent.
On the one hand, the largest amount that a periphery agent can retain if he reneges on
his obligations is (d+ f). On the other hand, the expected discounted future benet of
trading in the star network relative to no trade is at least 1 

1
2(q)  12f   cm

. Indeed,
the rst term, 12(q), reects the gains from trading weighted by the probability that the
agent is assigned the investment role. The second term, 12f , reects the expected fee that
an agent must pay to the center agent, when he is an investment agent matched with
another periphery agent. The third term reects the transaction cost. Thus, if
 (d+ f) + 
1  

1
2
(q)  1
2
f   cm

 0;
or
f  1
1=2 + 

 d+ 1
2
(q)  cm

; (5)
then a periphery agent has incentive to make repayments.
Next, consider the incentive of the center agent. On the one hand, the largest amount
that the center agent can retain if he reneges on his obligations is nd. On the other hand,
the expected discounted future benet from trading and intermediating relative to not
trading in the star network is 1 

1
2(q) + (n  1) f   (2n  1) cm

. As before, the rst
term, 12(q), reects the relative gains from trading weighted by the probability that the
agent is an investment agent. In addition, every period he receives an amount (n  1)f in
fees, while his total transaction cost is (2n 1)cm. Thus, the center agent has an incentive
to make repayments if
 nd+ 
1  

1
2
(q) + (n  1) f   (2n  1) cm

 0;
which holds when
f  d+ 2cm; (6)
since  d+ 12(q)  cm  0 from (5). Setting d = q+ cm, condition (4) ensures that there
exists a fee f that satises the two inequalities (5) and (6).
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The condition for implementation of an investment level, q, in a star network is compa-
rable to the complete information case. Indeed, if we take f = 0 and cm = 0 in inequality
(5) we obtain condition (2) as when there is complete information. However, condition
(6) reects a crucial distinction that arises because of the asymmetry in the information
that center and periphery agents can access in a star network. While the center agent has
information about all other agents in the economy, a periphery agent has information only
about the center. Thus, the center agent has the incentive to repay only when he expects
to receive a positive fee. In fact, condition (6) is a lower bound and condition (5) is an
upper bound for the fee that the center agent must receive, in the limit as the number of
market participants grows large.
3.2.2 Welfare and e¢ ciency
Next we turn to the welfare properties of networks, taking the linking costs into account.
Our aim is to characterize constrained e¢ cient networks. We begin with our welfare
criterion. Given a network g, and an investment level q, the expected aggregate welfare
when trades take place is given by
W (g; q) =
1X
t=0
tn

R(q)  q + 1  4gcl   2(g + 1)cm
	
(7)
where g represents the average number of links, and g represents the average number of
intermediaries between pairs of agents in g, respectively.
As it is evident from (7), the direct e¤ect of a network structure, g, on welfare can be
summarized by only two variables, g and g. Given the network g, the total informational
cost per period is jEj  (2cl) = (2n)  g  (2cl). The total transaction cost depends on the
realization of the matching. However, in expectation, in any given period, it only depends
on the average number of intermediaries, and hence the total expected transaction cost is
n  (g + 1)  (2cm). Next, we dene constrained e¢ ciency.
Denition 3 A network g and an investment level q is a constrained e¢ cient arrangement
if it maximizes W (g; q) over the space of connected networks and investment levels such
that q is implementable in g.
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Maximizing expected social welfare involves a trade-o¤. On the one hand, the welfare
function (7) is increasing in the level of investment, q. On the other hand, there may be
high linking costs associated with a network that implements a higher q. For instance,
while it is possible to implement the rst-best level of investment in the complete network,
the linking costs become innitely large as the number of market participants grows.
A good candidate for a constrained e¢ cient arrangement is a network that can im-
plement high levels of investment at low linking costs, such as the star network. Indeed,
let q be the largest investment level that can be implemented asymptotically in the star
network, that is,
q = arg max  (q)
s.t. (q + cm) + 2cm  1
1=2 + 

 (q + cm) + 1
2
(q)  cm

:
We have the following result.
Proposition 2 Suppose the rst best level of investment is implementable in a star net-
work gn, or q = 1. Then (gn; q) is the unique constrained e¢ cient arrangement for
su¢ ciently large n.
The intuition is as follows. From Proposition 1, we know that a star network can
implement the rst-best investment level when (4) holds for q = 1. Thus, we only need
to show that the star network minimizes the linking costs relative to all other connected
networks. The key trade-o¤ then is between the transaction and informational costs,
and we prove that it never pays o¤ to decrease the transaction costs while increasing
informational costs for large ns, independently of cm and cl. The class of networks that
have the lowest informational costs is the class of minimally connected networks. In a
minimally connected network there exists a unique path between any pair of agents. A
star networks is clearly a member of this class. Lastly, we show that transaction costs are
minimized in the star among all minimally connected networks for su¢ ciently large n.
When the rst-best is not implementable in a star network (q < 1), the trade-o¤
between the level of investment and linking costs that the welfare function (7) embeds is
even more pronounced. In particular, the gains from trade in a connected network must
be su¢ ciently high to compensate for the linking costs that agents incur each period. We
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analyze the resolution of this trade-o¤ asymptotically. For this purpose, we rst introduce
the following denition.
Denition 4 Let fgngn be a sequence of networks. Then, a level of investment, q, is
asymptotically implementable in fgngn if there exists n such that q is implementable
in gn for all n  n. The sequence fgngn and the investment level q is an asymptotically
constrained e¢ cient arrangement if for any sequence of connected networks fg0ngn and
any q0 asymptotically implementable under fg0ngn, we have that W (gn; q)  W (g0n; q0) for
all large n.
Under asymptotic implementability, a level of investment is implementable only if it is
implementable in a sequence of networks in su¢ ciently large economies. The next result
shows that a star network can be asymptotically constrained e¢ cient even when the rst
best level of investment is not implementable.
Proposition 3 There exists a threshold bq < 1 such the star network, gn, and the level of
investment, q, is an asymptotically constrained e¢ cient arrangement whenever q  bq.
Proposition 3 extends the result in Proposition 2 to the case when the star network
cannot implement the rst best level of investment.
Before we lay out the intuition for this result, we need to introduce a class of networks
as follows. In Lemma A.1 in the Appendix we show that there exist  > 1 and  > 1
such that for any sequence of networks fgng in which gn   and gn   for all n, if a
level of investment, q, is asymptotically implementable in fgng, then it is asymptotically
implementable in star networks as well. We refer to a network g with g   and g  ,
as a small network. Given this result, the threshold bq is determined as the minimum q
such that
W (1; 1; q)  maxfW (1; ; 1);W (; 1; 1)g; (8)
where W
 
g; g; q

is the welfare in a network g with average number of links, g, and
with average number of intermediaries, g, when the investment level is q.
When q < 1, the trade-o¤ between the level of investment that is implementable and
linking costs for networks outside the class of small networks is resolved in favor of the
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star network, as long as q  bq. Indeed, condition (8) ensures that the potential increase
in the implementable investment level is o¤set by the increase in linking costs for any
network that is not small, relative to the star. Thus, we just need to prove that the
star network is the constrained e¢ cient one among the small networks. For this, we use
Lemma A.1 which shows that an investment level higher than q is not implementable in
networks in which linking costs are bounded by  and .9 Hence, the star network can
(asymptotically) implement the highest investment level among all small networks. Then,
using similar arguments as for Proposition 2, we show that the star network is also the
most e¢ cient one in terms of linking costs among all small networks for su¢ ciently large
n.
Note that according to Denition 3, a constrained e¢ cient network maximizes welfare
relative to all other connected networks. Thus, the results described in Proposition 2 and
3 do not require any condition for the value of the linking costs, cm and cl. Of course,
the implementability requirement places an upper bound on the transaction cost, cm.
However, as either informational or transaction costs rise, then the empty network may
yield higher welfare even when no trade takes place.
3.2.3 Intermediary fees
Another interesting implication that arises in our setup is related to the fees that the inter-
mediaries receive. In particular, the following result illustrates how the network structure
favors some intermediaries with respect to the fees they receive.
Corollary 1 Let fmaxg (q) be the maximum fee an intermediary can receive in a network g,
for a given implementable investment level q. Then, for any sequence fgngn of minimally
connected networks or small networks,
fmaxgn (q)  fmaxgn (q)
for all asymptotically implementable investment levels q in fgngn and for all n su¢ ciently
large.
9Since in a "small" network the average number of links and the average number of intermediaries are
bounded by  and , respectively, then aggregate informational cost is at most 4ncl, while the aggregate
transaction cost is at most 2n ( + 1) cm.
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Corollary 1 shows that the center agent in a star network can receive a higher fee than
any intermediary in a minimally connected or small network. While the result holds when
the same level of investment is asymptotically implemented in the star network as in a
minimally connected or small network, an additional mechanism strengthens this nding.
By Lemma A.1, the level of investment that is asymptotically implementable in a star
network is at least as high as in a small network (we show a similar result for minimally
connected networks in Babus and Hu, 2015). This implies that the surplus generated by
trading, as dened in (1), is at least as large in a star network. Since the fee represents a
division of the surplus between the center the periphery agents, a larger surplus makes it
feasible for center agent to receive higher fees.
Corollary 1 focuses on asymptotically implementable investment levels. For exactly
implementable investment levels, the maximum fee each of the two intermediaries in an
inter-linked star, represented in Figure 1(b), can receive is strictly smaller than the max-
imum fee the center agent in a star can receive. This is because a periphery agent in an
inter-linked star needs to pay fees to two intermediaries in any period with probability
half, when he has an investment opportunity. Thus, ensuring he has incentives to repay
places a tighter constraint on the fees that each intermediary receives. We can generalize
this argument and show that the analogous result holds for any interlinked stars with a
nite number of centers.10
4 Network Stability
We have demonstrated that the star network is the constrained e¢ cient arrangement. In
this section we investigate whether agents have incentives to participate in such a network
when traders are allowed to change their links. For this purpose, we rst introduce the
network formation game, and then propose a stability concept.
We consider the following network-formation game. At date 0, x a network g. At the
beginning of each even period t = 0; 2; :::, one agent k, selected at random, is allowed to
sever one or more of his links. At the beginning of each odd period t = 1; 3; ::::, one pair
of agents (k; k0), selected at random, are given the opportunity to form a link, if they do
10For a formal argument in a related model, see Babus and Hu (2015).
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not have one. If both agents agree, the link is formed. At each period t, agentslinking
decisions result in a new network gt.
After agents make their linking decisions, their types (liquidity or investment) are as-
signed, and the matching realizes. In the new network gt, an agent only observes each
of his current neighborsunilateral actions, as well as information that is common knowl-
edge. Then, the agents trade according to the trading procedure described in Section
3.1. Consistent with the previous section, we allow the nancial contract and the level
of investment to depend on the network structure. In particular, we consider a function
C(gt) that assigns to a network gt a contract, (dgt ; fgt), and an investment level qgt , that
specify the terms of trade. The function C () allows agents to evaluate their continuation
payo¤ for each linking decision they can take at date t, given the distribution of networks
that may arise at each future date  , and given the actions that other agents are expected
to take in the trading game in each possible network g .
We say that the function C () is tight if qgt is the highest level of investment that is
implementable in gt, provided the set of implementable investment levels is non-empty.
Given a tight function C (), a trading strategy prole is tight w.r.t. C () if agents in
any connected component of the network gt accept to trade among themselves, in each
period t when qgt is implementable in gt, and after any possible partial history of the
network-formation game (both on and o¤ equilibrium paths).
Denition 5 A network g is stable under [q; (d; f)] if there exist a tight function, with
C(g) = [q; (d; f)], and a Nash equilibrium in the network-formation game such that no
agent severs a link and no pair of agents forms new links, and agents use a tight trading
strategy prole.
The notion of stability that we propose here is consistent with the welfare analysis we
have developed in Section 3.2. In particular, it allows us to check whether constrained
e¢ cient networks are also stable. Moreover, focusing on a function that selects the highest
implementable level of investment for a given network, we are able to conceptualize the
value of a link in a dynamic setting. Indeed, as agents change links, they are still able to
extract the maximum surplus in the new network. This implies that the relative benet an
agent obtains by maintaining a link represents a lower bound for the value of the respective
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link.11
This notion of stability allows us to narrow down the set of stable networks in a
meaningful way. For instance, suppose we relax the requirement that agents use a tight
trading strategy. Instead, consider that agents refuse to trade with other agents that have
changed their links. Facing a severe punishment, agents may be deterred from severing or
forming new links. We conjecture that, in this case, most networks that can implement
positive levels of investment are stable. The requirement to use a tight strategy rules out
this type of unreasonable punishments.
We proceed to show that the star networks are stable. Let qn be the level of investment
such that
qn = arg max  (q)
s.t. min

1
n  1

n(q + cm)  1
2
(q) + 2ncm

; 0

 1n 1
2n 1 + 

 (q + cm) + 1
2
(q)  cm

:
(9)
In the proof of Proposition 1 we provide in the appendix, we show that (9) is the necessary
and su¢ cient condition for a level of investment q to be implementable in star network
with 2n agents. Thus, qn is the highest investment level that can be implemented in a
star network, for each n. Further, let fmaxgn and f
min
gn to denote right-hand side and the
left-hand side of condition (9) evaluated at qn, respectively. Hence, fmaxgn and f
min
gn are the
upper and lower bounds for the fee that the centre agent in a star with 2n agents receives.
Note that fmaxgn > f
min
gn only if q

n = 1. We have the following result.
Proposition 4 Suppose that 0 < cl  12(qn + cm). Then, gn is stable under [q; (d; f)] =
[qn; (qn + cm; fn)] for any fn 2 [fminn ; fmaxn ], provided that n is su¢ ciently large.
Proposition 4 shows that a star network is stable, if the informational cost, cl, is small
and the economy size, 2n, is large. It is indeed expected that if cl is high, then agents are
better o¤ by not trading, and, hence, the resulting equilibrium in the network formation
11Our notion of stability is closely related to the pairwise stability concept introduced by Jackson and
Wolinski (1996). While pairwise stability is a static concept, ours is a dynamic notion based on noncoop-
erative game reasoning. In particular, the random selection of an agent to sever his links ensures that a
stable network according to our denition is also individually rational given the linking choices of others.
Similarly, the random selection of a pair of agents to form new links ensures that our stability is robust to
a size-two group defection.
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game will leave the network an empty one. Similarly, if n is small, agents can enforce
contracts and trade in the empty network, saving on linking costs.
The intuition for the stability result is as follows. To see whether a star network is
stable, we need to study agentsincentives to sever or form links. In particular, there are
two main cases we need to consider. First, we need to show that the center agent has
no incentive to delete any link. Second, we need to show that no periphery agent has an
incentive to form a new link with another periphery agent.
We start with the center agent, kC . We illustrate how he evaluates his continuation
payo¤ when he makes a linking decision, given the notion of stability we proposed in
Denition 5. Suppose that at the beginning of an even date t, the center agent, kC , is
given the opportunity to sever one or more of his links. If he severs links with a set KC of
his neighbors, the new network is gt  = gn   f(kC ; k0) : k0 2 KCg. As usual in equilibrium
analysis, he considers that all other agents respect their equilibrium linking strategy at
future dates. We construct equilibrium linking strategies with the property that agents
do not sever or form new links after any partial history. This implies that the center
agent expects that g = gt  for any  > t. Further, he understands that the function
C () selects the highest level of investment, qgt  , that is implementable in gt , that qgt  is
implemented and trade takes place forever after. Otherwise, if he maintains all his links,
the new network is gt = gn, and he reasons in the same way to evaluate his continuation
payo¤. For the star network to be stable he must nd it benecial to maintain all his
links. We show that this is the case by proving that the marginal value of a link for the
center is bounded away from zero. Indeed, we nd that the highest level of investment in
the new network gt  can only be lower than qn. In consequence, there exists a function
C () that allocates a fee, f , to agent kC in the new network gt , which ensures a positive
lower bound for the marginal value of a link. This implies that the centre has no incentive
to sever any link provided that cl is small.
Next, we discuss the case of periphery agents. When a periphery agent, k, considers
whether to form a link with another periphery agent, k0, he evaluates his continuation
payo¤ following a similar reasoning process as described above. If, at an odd period t,
the agents consent to form a link, the new network is gt+ = g

n + f(k; k0)g. Otherwise,
the new network is gt = gn. In the network gt+, both agents k and k0 are able to trade
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directly through their link, without paying a fee to the center agent in those periods when
they are matched to trade. However, as n grows large, the probability of avoiding the fee
diminishes, which makes the link too expensive to maintain. Thus, the new network gt+
would be more attractive than gn only if the fee paid to agent kC is lower. We show that
there exists a function C () that allocates a fee, f , to agent kC in the new network gt+
which is higher than, or arbitrarily close to fn, as n goes innity. This ensures that two
periphery agents do not have an incentive to form a new link.
We conclude this section with a remark about our notion of stability. A stronger notion
of stability that departs from Denition 5 may also seem natural. Under Denition 5, a
tight function can assign any fee, f , to intermediaries in a network g such that the level of
investment q is implementable in g. In contrast, we can consider that a network is stable
only if agents maintain their links for all fees (subject to implementability) that can be
assigned in the current network, as well as in networks that arise on the continuation paths
that follow deviations. Under this stronger notion, the star network may not be stable
when the inequality (4) is slack. Indeed, there may exist a function C () which assigns
fees to intermediaries in the network resulting from a deviation, in a way that favors the
agents who just deviated. For instance, suppose that the center agent deletes one or more
of his links. Consider a function C () that assigns to the center agent a higher fee than
in the original star network. At the same time, the function C () can assign a lower fee
to the center agent when two periphery agents form a link. For the star network to be
stable under this stronger notion, the center agent must not nd it benecial to delete
links, which implies that the fee he receives in the original network has to be su¢ ciently
high. Similarly, the periphery agents must not nd it benecial to form a link between
themselves, which implies that the fee they pay to the center agent in the original network
has to be su¢ ciently low. Since a fee that meets both requirement may not exist, the
star network may not be stable. A similar line of reasoning can be used to argue that
an interlinked star is not stable either. In fact, this stronger notion of stability is a very
demanding property, and we expect that many networks do not satisfy it. Nevertheless,
the proof of Proposition 4 suggests that the star is stable under this stronger notion when
condition (4) holds with equality, as this narrows the set of fees a function C () can assign.
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5 Discussions
5.1 Other Trading Frictions
In our framework each agent has either cash or an opportunity to invest every period.
Moreover, all agents are matched and it is feasible for all pairs to realize the gains from
trade at each date. One can extend our framework and allow for additional frictions in the
matching and trading process. For instance, we can assume that each investment agent
has the opportunity to invest only with probability p at each date. Our framework is the
special case where p = 1. The case p = 1=2n is equivalent to assuming that only a pair of
agents trade at any given period.
We conjecture that most of our results go through if this type of trading frictions are
not too severe. For example, we conjecture that the star is still a constrained e¢ cient
arrangement if p is su¢ ciently close to 1, even as n grows large.
However, a su¢ ciently high trading frequency is crucial for our results. Indeed, if the
probability, p, of arrival of the investment opportunity is too small, then no investment
level q > 0 is implementable under any network. The logic is as follows. Suppose that,
by contradiction, we can implement a contract (d; f) in a network g, when the investment
level is q. Then, consider the incentives to repay of an investment agent who is selected
in a given period to receive the investment opportunity. On the one hand, the agent
can retain at least d if he reneges on his obligations. On the other hand, the expected
discounted future benet of trading relative to not trading is at most p2(q). Then, an
investment agent has the incentive to make repayments only if
 d+ p
2
 (q)  0:
For any q > 0 and d  q, this condition is violated if p is su¢ ciently low.
5.2 Collateralized Trades
In our model, trade can only take place through unsecured transactions. We can extend
the model and incorporate collateralized trades. One way to allow for collateralized trades
is to endow an investment agent with a riskless asset that cannot be used to nance the
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investment project but may be used as collateral. As before, the role of the informational
network is to facilitate unsecured trade, if there are positive gains from trading without
collateral relative to trading against collateral. One potential reason why unsecured trade
is welfare improving is that collateral could be ine¢ ciently liquidated by the liquidity
agent, when trade is secured.
Babus and Hu (2015) explore this extension with an explicit formulation of gains from
unsecured trade relative to secured trade, and show that our results hold. One virtue of
this extension is that, depending on the economic fundamentals, the e¢ cient arrangement
is either unsecured trade in the star network or secured trade without an informational
network (i.e. secured trade in the empty network). In particular, the star network is
e¢ cient when the limited commitment issue is not too severe.
6 Conclusion
Our results demonstrate that intermediation can be welfare-improving when OTC trades
take place through networks if the market size is large. In our model, networks can provide
adequate monitoring to sustain unsecured trade, provided nancial contracts are designed
to respect tradersincentives. In particular, we show that intermediaries must receive fees
to ensure they have the incentive to sustain trade. We characterize an upper and lower
bound for the fees intermediaries receive in various networks. We also show that the fee
to the intermediary in the star network is the highest relative to how intermediaries in
various other networks can be compensated. The way compensation of intermediaries is
determined in our model may provide an explanation for the rents intermediaries receive
in OTC markets.
Our analysis of the constrained e¢ cient arrangement highlights a trade-o¤ between the
cost of maintaining and using a network, and the investment level that is implementable
in a network. We provide conditions under which the star is the constrained e¢ cient
arrangement among all possible arrangements. We obtain this result when the market
size is large, and when the star can implement a level of investment that is close to the
rst-best level. Finally, we show that the star network is a stable structure as well.
27
References
Afonso, G., A. Kovner, and A. Schoar, 2014, Trading Partners in the Interbank Lending
Market, working paper, MIT.
Allen, F., and D. Gale, 1999, Innovations in Financial Services, Relationships, and Risk
Sharing, Management Science 45, 12391253.
Babus, A., and T.W. Hu, 2015, Endogenous Intermediation in Over-the-Counter Markets,
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10708.
Babus, A., and P. Kondor, 2013, Trading and Information Di¤usion in Over-the-Counter
Markets, CEPR discussion paper 9271.
Bartolini, L., S. Hilton, and J. McAndrews, 2010, Settlement Delays in the Money Market,
Journal of Banking & Finance Volume 34, 934945.
Chang, B., and S. Zhang, 2015, Endogenous Market Making and Network Formation,
working paper University of Wisconson.
Colla, P., and A. Mele, 2010, Information Linkages and Correlated Trading, Review of
Financial Studies 23, 203246.
Di Maggio, M., and A. Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015, Collateral Shortages and Intermediation
Networks, working paper, Columbia University.
Du, W., S. Gadgil, M. Gordy, and C. Vega, 2015, Counterparty Risk and Counterparty
Choice in the Credit Default Swap Market, working paper, Federal Reserve Board.
Du¢ e, D., N. Garleanu, and L.H. Pedersen, 2005, Over-the-Counter Markets, Economet-
rica 73, 18151847.
Du¢ e, D., M. Scheicher, and G. Vuillemey ., 2015, Central Clearing and Collateral De-
mand, Journal of Financial Economics 116, 237256.
Fainmesser, I., 2014, Exclusive Intermediation, working paper, Johns Hopkins University.
Glode, V., and C. Opp, 2015, Adverse Selection and Intermediation Chains, working paper,
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
28
Gofman, M., 2014, A Network-Based Analysis of Over-the-Counter Markets, working pa-
per, University of Wisconsin.
Gorton, G., and T. Muir, 2015, Mobile Collateral versus Immobile Collateral, working
paper, Yale University.
Greif, A., 1993, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The
Maghribi TradersCoalition, American Economic Review 83, 525548.
Hollield, B., A. Neklyudov, and C. Spatt, 2014, Bid-Ask Spreads and the Pricing of
Securitizations: 144a vs. Registered Securitizations, working paper, Carnegie Mellon.
Hugonnier, J., B. Lester, and P.O. Weill, 2014, Heterogeneity in Decentralized Asset
Markets, working paper UCLA.
Jackson, M., and A. Wolinsky, 1996, A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks,
Journal of Economic Theory 71, 4474.
Klein, B., and K. Le­ er, 1981, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Per-
formance, Journal of Political Economy 89, 615641.
Li, D., and N. Schürho¤, 2014, Dealer Networks, working paper, University of Lausanne.
Malamud, Semyon, and Marzena Rostek, 2014, Decentralized Exchange, working paper
University of Wisconsin.
Neklyudov, A., 2014, Bid-Ask Spreads and the Over-the-Counter Interdealer Markets:
Core and Peripheral Dealers, working paper, Univesity of Lausanne.
Ozsoylev, H., and J. Walden, 2011, Asset Pricing in Large Information Networks, Journal
of Economic Theory 146, 22522280.
Tirole, J., 1996, Theory of collective reputations, Review of Economic Studies 63, 122.
Zawadowski, A., 2013, Entangled Financial Systems, Review of Financial Studies 26,
12911323.
29
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
(i) First we prove su¢ ciency. Set d = q. We construct a strategy prole and show that it
is a simple equilibrium, as follows. For each possible match m = (`; i), we summarize the
observed history of the match at the end of period t (which is observable to the match)
with a state sm;t 2 fG;Bg. We use mr to denote the match with the same pair of agents
but with their roles reversed, i.e., mr = (i; `). The state is such that sm;t = smr;t for all t,
and it evolves as follows: sm;0 = smr;0 = G; sm;t+1 = G if sm;t = G and if either one of
the following two conditions holds: (a) neither m or mr realizes at period t+ 1, (b) either
m or mr is realized, and the agent assigned to the investment role repays his debt if the
unsecured trade is accepted; sm;t+1 = B otherwise. Note that for any match m = (`; i) at
period t, the pairs actions have no e¤ect on states sm0;t with m0 having agents other than
the pair.
For any realized match m = (`; i) at period t, the strategy for the pair only depends
on sm;t 1 as follows: ` accepts the proposed trade from i if sm;t 1 = G and rejects it
otherwise; i repays his debt if sm;t 1 = G and does not repay otherwise.
Now we show that this strategy prole is sequentially rational. Consider a realized
match m = (`; i) at period t. Because state B is self-absorbing, if sm;t 1 = B, i has no
incentive to repay his debt and hence it is optimal for ` to reject the trade. Now, suppose
that sm;t 1 = G. By the equilibrium strategy of i, he will repay if his trade is accepted.
Moreover, accepting or rejecting the trade has no impact on future states of the match.
Thus, the current-period payo¤ for ` to accept the proposed trade is (d + (1   q)) while
the current-period payo¤ to reject the trade is 1; since d = q, the two payo¤s are the
same. Hence, it is optimal for agent ` to accept the proposed trade. Finally, assuming
that the proposed trade from i was accepted by `, by repaying the debt, is expected
continuation equilibrium payo¤ is (assuming that the number of other agents j 6= ` for
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which s(i;j);t 1 = B is k  2n  2)
 d+ 
1  

k
2n  10:5 +
2n  k   1
2n  1 [0:5(R(q)  d) + 0:5(d+ 1  q)]

=  q + 1


0:5[R(q)  q] + 0:5  0:5k
2n  1[R(q)  q]

;
in contrast, by not repaying the debt, is equilibrium strategy implies that his expected
continuation payo¤ is given by

1  

k + 1
2n  10:5 +
2n  2  k
2n  1 [0:5(R(q)  d) + 0:5(d+ 1  q)]

=
1


0:5[R(q)  q] + 0:5  0:5(k + 1)
2n  1 [R(q)  q]

:
Recalling that (q) = R(q)  q, by (3), it is optimal for him to repay his debt.
(ii) Now we show that, for any given q > 0, it is not implementable for large ns. Here we
assume that  > 12 ; the other case can be proved in a similar fashion. Let N be so large
that if K = log2(2N   1)  1, then
K
2   1 +
K
1   <
q
(q)
: (A.1)
Suppose, by contradiction, that q is implementable with 2n  2N agents. Now, at period
zero, consider an agent with the investment role at the end of period 0 and is supposed to
repay his promise, d  q.
Consider the deviation to default now and, in all future period, behave as a non-
defector. The worst scenario for this deviation would be that his current trading partner
defects in all future periods, and all who are defected also defect. Thus, at period t, the
probability of meeting a defector is at most
pt  minf2
t 1; 2n  1g
2n  1 :
Hence, the expected continuation payo¤ is at least
P1
t=1 
t(1 pt)(q), and, for the agent
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to prefer the equilibrium action than this deviation, it must be the case that
 d+
1X
t=1
t(q) 
1X
t=1
t(1  pt)(q);
that is,
d 
1X
t=1
tpt(q): (A.2)
Now, for any n  N (recall that N is dened by (A.1)) and for k = log2(2n  1)  1, we
have
1X
t=1
tpt  (2n  1)
k   1
(2n  1)(2   1) +
k
1  
 
K
2   1 +
K
1   <
q
(q)
 d
(q)
;
a contradiction to (A.2). 
Proof of Proposition 1
We claim that q is implementable under star if and only if (9) holds. Note that (4) implies
(9) for any n > 0: rst,
1
1
2 + 

 (q + cm) + 1
2
(q)  cm

 1n 1
2n 1 + 

 (q + cm) + 1
2
(q)  cm

since 12 +   n 12n 1 +  for any n; second,
n(q + cm)  1
2
(q) + (2n  1)cm  (n  1) [(q + cm) + 2cm]
since  (q + cm) + 12(q)  cm  0.
First we prove necessity of (9). Let kC be the center agent. Suppose that (d; f) with
d  q + cm implements q under the star. Consider a periphery agent assigned to the
investment role, deciding whether to repay his debt, f + d. We consider two choices: (a)
repay the debt and follow the equilibrium strategies; (b) do not repay and receive no trade
in all following periods. By (A1), the choice (a) has to be better than the choice (b), and
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hence we have
 (d+ f) + 
1  

1
2

(R(q)  q + 1)  2n  2
2n  1f

  cm

 
1  
1
2
; (A.3)
that is,
f  1n 1
2n 1 + 

 d+ 1
2
(q)  cm

: (A.4)
Now consider the center agent, kC , assigned to the investment role and who is at the
moment deciding whether to repay his debt, nd. Again, we consider two choices: (a)
repay all the debts and follow the equilibrium strategies; (b) do not repay (to any debt)
and receive trade in all following periods. By (A1), the choice (a) has to be better than
the choice (b), and hence we have
 nd+ 
1  

1
2
[R(q)  q + 1] + (n  1)f   2ncm

 
1  
1
2
;
that is,
f  1
n  1

nd  1
2
(q) + 2ncm

: (A.5)
Combining (A.4) and (A.5) and the fact that d  q + cm, we obtain (9).
Now we prove su¢ ciency. Suppose that (9) holds. First we specify the nancial
contracts as follows: let d = q + cm and let f  0 satisfy
1
n  1

nd  1
2
(q) + 2ncm

 f  1n 1
2n 1 + 

 d+ 1
2
(q)  cm

:
Given the contracts, the liquidity agent is indi¤erent between no trade and the proposed
trades, assuming that the investment agent will repay the trades. We construct equilibrium
strategies as follows. Each periphery agent can be one of the two states, G or B. At date
0, all agents are in state G. A periphery agent stays in state G if and only if he repays
his debts to kC when assigned to the investment role in all previous periods; otherwise,
he enters state B. An agent who enters state B stays there forever. The state of these
agents is only observable to the center agent, kC . Note that if a periphery agent proposes
to trade directly then this choice does not a¤ect his state and a periphery agents action
in liquidity role does not a¤ect his state. Similarly, the center agent, kC , can also be in
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of the two states, G or B. He stays in state G if and only if he repays his debts in all
previous periods; otherwise, he enters state B. His state is then observable to all agents.
The strategy of a periphery agent j assigned to the liquidity role in state G is as
follows: if kC is in state G and if j is in state G, then he accepts any trade through kC ;
otherwise, he rejects. Moreover, he never accepts if asked to trade directly. A periphery
agent j assigned to the liquidity role in state B never accepts trades. The strategy of a
periphery agent j in investment role is as follows: if both himself and kC are in state G,
then he propose to trade through kC and repay his debt; otherwise, he proposes to trade
directly and, if his trade is accepted, he does not repay anything. Finally, the strategy of
kC is as follows: if he is in state B, then he never repays anything; otherwise, he accepts
trades from a match m = (`; i) if and only if both ` and i are in state G and rejects it
otherwise, and he repays all debts if and only if it is feasible and the number of periphery
agents in state G who repays at the current period, denoted by K1, and the number of
loans kC has, denoted by K2 (including his own), satisfy
 K2d+ 
1  

K1
2(2n  1) [R(q)  q + 1 + (K1   1)f ] +
2n  1 K1
2(2n  1)

 
2(1  ) :
(A.6)
Note that when there are still K1 periphery agents in state G, the expected fees for each
such agent is (K1   1)f=2(2n   1) and since any such fee is paid to kC , the expected fee
revenue is K1(K1   1)f=2(2n   1). Moreover, only with those agents kC can expect to
have trades.
We also need to construct equilibrium beliefs. As agent kC has complete information,
his belief is the actual history. For an periphery agent j, his belief is such that if kC is
in state G, then he believes that all other agents are also in state G. Note that once kC
enters state B, a periphery agents belief does not matter to his equilibrium strategy any
more.
To show that these strategies form a simple equilibrium, rst notice that (A1)-(A3)
are satised. Moreover, the agentsbeliefs are consistent with equilibrium strategies. In
particular, when a proposed trade is rejected with kC in state G, it is believed to be a
mistake and agents are all in state G and will continue to accept trades and repay from
next period on. We use the one-shot-deviation principle to verify sequential rationality.
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By (A.4) and (A.5) and the previous discussion no agent has incentive to deviate along
the equilibrium path. On the o¤-equilibrium path, the history is summarized by the
conguration of states. For a periphery agent assigned to the liquidity role, because kC
will not accept any trade from an investment agent in state B, he is indi¤erent between
accepting a unsecured trade with kC and having no trade so long as kC is in state G and
it is optimal to reject any other trade (note that a periphery investment agent will not
repay any debt incurred through direct trading). For a periphery agent in investment role,
as their state only depends on whether they repay kC , their incentive is determined by
(A.4). Note that as they believe all other agents are in state G, the continuation payo¤ is
given by the left side of (A.3). Finally, for kC , (A.6) determines whether he has incentive
to remain in state G or not. 
Proof of Proposition 2
First note that under the star network, gn, with 2n agents, gn = 1   1=2n and gn =
1   1=n. Since q = 1 and hence the rst-best level of investment is implementable, the
average welfare is given by
W  =
1
2

[R(1)  1] + 1  4

1  1
2n

cl   2

1  1
n

cm

:
Since the star network already implements the rst-best level of investment, it remains to
show that it minimizes linking costs (both recurrent and idiosyncratic) among all connected
networks.
First it is easy to verify that the idiosyncratic costs are minimized under star among
all minimally connected networks.
Next, we show that for any connected network gn with 2n agents,
gn + 1  2 
2
2n  1gn :
To see this, note that for each agent j, any agent who is directed connected to him has
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distance 1 but every other agent has distance at least 2, and hence
gn + 1 
P
j2N fdeg(j) + 2[2n  1  deg(j)]g
2n(2n  1)
=
4n(2n  1)  2(2n)gn
2n(2n  1)
= 2  2
2n  1gn ;
where deg(j) is the degree of agent j.
Thus, the network costs of gn per capita, denoted by Cn, satises
Cn = 4gncl + 2gncm  4gncl + 2

2  2
2n  1gn

cm:
Now, let Cn = 4(1  12n)cl   2(2  1=n)cm be the corresponding cost for the star network,
we have
Cn   Cn  S(gn ; n)  4

gn  

1  1
2n

cl +

1
2n
  1
2n  1gn

cm

:
Now, for each n, S1(gn ; n) = 4fcl   12n 1cmg: Then, for all n > N2, S1(gn ; n) > 0 and
hence is strictly increasing in gn . Since we are only concerned with networks other than
the minimally connected one, we may assume that gn  1. Now, for all n > N2,
S(gn ; n)  S(1; n)  4

1
2n
cl +

1
2n
  1
2n  1

cm

> 0:
This implies that Cn   Cn > 0. 
Before we prove Proposition 3, we give a lemma.
Lemma A.1 Let fgngn be a sequence of networks. There exist  > 1 and  > 1 such
that, if gn   and gn   for all n, then the level of investment q is asymptotically
implementable only if (4) holds.
Proof Here we choose  = 1:05 and  = 1:05. Let
en = (2n  1)2  
6
  1: (A.7)
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For n  100, en  0:3n. Let g be a given network with 2n agents with g   and g  
under which q is implementable with nancial contract (d; f), d  q + cm. We show that,
for n  100,
d  1
0:15n
(q) + 2cm  f 
 d+ 12(q)  cm
n 1
2n 1 + 
: (A.8)
By taking n to innity in the above inequality and replacing d with q+ cm, we obtain (4).
To show the rst inequality in (A.8), we nd an agent whose incentive is similar to
that of the center agent in the star network. We rst need a claim about existence of an
agent j with large degrees.
Claim 1. Let  be the maximum degree in g. Then,
  (2n  1)2  g
6g
  1: (A.9)
Proof. Let j be the degree of agent j. Then,
2n(2n  1)(g + 1)  3
24X
j2N
0@2n  1  j   X
j0 linked to j
j0
1A35
 3 f2n[2n  1]  2jE(gn)j   2jE(gn)jg
 3 (2n) [2n  1  2g(1 + )]:
Then, (A.9) follows directly by rearranging terms. 
Since g   and g  , (A.9) also implies that   en. Hence, we can nd an agent
j who has degree at least en  0:3n. Now, consider, S, the set of js neighbors. Since
by deleting all the links between agents in S the network is still connected (through j), it
follows that the number of those links has to be at most
2n   (2n  1) = 2n(   1) + 1  0:1n+ 1:
Thus, there are at least 0:15n agents in the set S who has no link with any other agent
in S. Thus, let K be the maximum number of intermediated trades for agent j and, by
(A2), we have K  0:15n. Note that the expected number of fees for j is less than K. To
37
ensure that a simple equilibrium exists, considering js incentive, it must be the case that
 Kd+ 
1  

1
2
(q) +Kf   2Kcm

 0: (A.10)
Since K  0:15n, (A.10) implies the rst inequality in (A.8).
Now we show the second inequality in (A.8). Since jE(gn)j = 2ng  2n = 2:1n and
hence the sum of all agentsdegrees is less than 4:2n, and since there exists one agent
with degree at least 0:3n, there exists an agent with degree less than (4:2  0:3)=2 = 1:95.
Hence, there exists some agent with only one link. Since he has only one link, he cannot
serve as an intermediary but has to go through an intermediary as an investment agent
with probability at least n 12n 1 . Thus, for it to be optimal to repay his largest possible
debt, d+ f , when assigned to the investment role, it must be the case that
 (d+ f) + 
1  

1
2
(q)  cm   n  1
2n  1f

 0: (A.11)
By rearranging terms, (A.11) implies the second inequality in (A.8). 
Proof of Proposition 3
Let fgng be a sequence of networks and let q be dened in the main text. Consider two
cases. First, suppose that gn   and gn   innitely often. Then, by Lemma A.1 (ii),
q  q. Since, by the arguments in Proposition 2, the star minimizes the linking costs
among all connected networks for large ns, the candidate arrangement dominates that
sequence. Next, suppose that gn >  or gn >  for all su¢ ciently large n. Since q
  q^
and hence W (1; 1; q)  maxfW (; 1; 1);W (1; ; 1)g, q and the star network performs
better for large ns. 
Proof of Corollary 1
By Lemma A.1, if investment level q is asymptotically implementable in a sequence of
small networks, fgng, then (4) holds for q, and, by Proposition 1, it is also implementable
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in fgng. Moreover, by the proof of Lemma A.1 (the second inequality in (A.8)),
fmaxgn (q) 
 (q + cm) + 12(q)  cm
n 1
2n 1 + 
;
and, by the the proof of Proposition 1 (the second inequality in (9)),
fmaxgn (q) =
 (q + cm) + 12(q)  cm
n 1
2n 1 + 
:
Thus, fmaxgn (q)  fmaxgn (q).
For minimally connected networks, Babus and Hu (2015) prove a similar result to
Lemma A.1 regarding asymptotic implementability (Proposition 4 (i) there) and a similar
result regarding the intermediation fees (Corollary 1 there) in a related setting. The proofs
there can be readily modied to t our current setting. 
Proof of Proposition 4
We consider the following strategies and show they constitute a Nash equilibrium and use
a tight trading strategy prole. First, agents never sever existing links or form new links
in equilibrium. After any deviation, they also never sever existing links or form new links
in equilibrium. In the trading game, all connected agents accept unsecured trades from
other connected agents as long as the set of implementable investment levels under gt at
period t is non-empty (and conduct secured trades otherwise), both on and o¤ equilibrium
paths.
First we show that the center agent has no incentive to delete any link. We begin
with a claim about the implementable investment levels in networks where the center has
deleted some of his links.
Claim 1. Let gK be the resulting network by deleting K links from the star. If the set of
implementable investment levels is non-empty in gK , then, the highest level implementable
under gK , denoted by qK , satises qK  qn for n large.
Proof. First we give necessary conditions for implementability. Fix some candidate in-
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vestment level and contract, [q; (d; f)]. Consider the incentive of a connected periphery:
 (d+ f) + 
1  

2n K   1
2(2n  1) (q) 
2n K   2
2(2n  1) f  
2n K   1
2n  1 cm

 0:
This implies that
G(f;K)   

+
2n K   2
2(2n  1)

f   d+ 2n K   1
2(2n  1) [(q)  2cm]  0;
and that the upper bound for f given q is given by the implicit function f = g(K) such
that G(g(K);K) = 0. Now, for K  2n  2,
Gf =  

+
2n K   2
2(2n  1)

 0
and
GK =
1
2(2n  1)f  
1
2(2n  1) [(q)  2cm]:
Since g0(K) =  Gf=GK , to show that g0(K)  0, it su¢ ces to show that GK  0, that is,
g(K)  (q)  2cm, which in turn is equivalent to
 d+ 2n K   1
2(2n  1) [(q)  2cm] 

+
2n  2 K
2(2n  1)

[(q)  2cm]:
Rearranging the terms and taking d = q + cm, it su¢ ces to show that
 (q + cm) + 1
2(2n  1) [(q)  2cm]  [(q)  2cm]:
Note that if  (q + cm) + 1=2[(q)   2cm] < 0, then the proposed trade is not imple-
mentable. Let q be the lowest q for which  (q + cm) + 1=2[(q)  2cm]  0. Given that
q  q, we may replace the right-side with zero and the above inequality holds if
2(2n  1)(q + cm)  [(q)  2cm]  0;
which holds for large n and q  q.
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Now, consider the incentive for the center agent. We have
 2n K
2
d+
(2n  1 K)
(1  )(2n  1)

(q)
2
+
2n  2 K
2
f   (2n  1 K)cm

 0:
This implies that
H(f;K)  (2n  2 K)f + (q)  (2n K)(2n  1)
(2n  1 K) d  2(2n  1 K)cm  0:
The lower bound for f given q is then given by the implicit function f = h(K) such that
H(h(K);K) = 0, and h0(K) =  HK=Hf . Now,
Hf = 2n  2 K  0
and
HK =  f    (2n  1)(2n  1 K) + (2n K)(2n  1)
(2n  1 K)2 d+ 2cm:
Note that h0(K)  0 if HK  0, which holds if
h(K)    2n  1
(2n  1 K)2d+ 2cm:
This holds if
 (q) + (2n K)(2n  1)
2n  1 K (q + cm) + 2cm  0:
Again, we have this inequality if q  q and n large.
Combining these incentives, we have
 (q) + (2n K)(2n 1)(2n 1 K) d+ 2(2n  1 K)cm
2n  2 K 
 d+ 2n K 12(2n 1) [(q)  2cm]
+ 2n K 22(2n 1)
: (A.12)
By taking derivatives with respective to K, we have veried that the left-hand side is
increasing in K while the right-hand side is decreasing in K. Thus, qK , dened as the
maximizer to maxq (q) subject to (A.12) with d = q+ cm, must satisfy qK  q0 = qn. 
Now, for each K where the set of investment levels is non-empty under gK , let C(gK) =
[qK ; (qK + cm; fK)], where fK corresponds to the left-hand side of (A.12) with q = qK .
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When qK is not implementable, we have agents receive no trade and the center receives
no fee.
Then, under the contract q = qn, d = qn + cm and f = fn  fminn , the benet per
period by deleting K links (relative to the star network) is less than

2n  1 K
2(2n  1) (qK) +
(2n  1 K)(2n  2 K)
2(2n  1) fK  
(2n  1 K)2
2n  1 cm

 

1
2
(qn) + (n  1)fminn   (2n  1)cm

+Kcl
=
2n K
2
(qK + cm)  n(qn + cm) +Kcl:
Now, by Claim 1, qK  qn; hence,
2n K
2
(qK + cm)  n(qn + cm) +Kcl  K

 
2
(qn + cm) + cl

 0;
provided that cl  12(qn + cm). This shows that the center agent does not want to sever
any link.
Next, we show that when a pair of two leaf agents are chosen in the linking stage,
they have no incentive to form a link. Let g0 denote the network by having exactly two
periphery agents forming a new link between them.
Claim 2. Let g0 be the network by having exactly two periphery agents forming a new
link between them, and let q0 be the highest level of investment implementable under g0.
(a) Suppose that (4) holds for q = 1 with strict inequality. Then, for n large, q0 = 1 and
there is a corresponding fee f 0  fn.
(b) Suppose that (4) does not hold for q = 1 with strict inequality. Then, for any fee f 0
corresponding to q0, both jf 0   fnj and jq0   qnj converge to zero as n goes to innity.
Proof. Fix a candidate contract, [q; (d; f)] with d = q + cm. Consider the center agent.
His incentive requires
 nd+ 
1  

1
2
(q) + (2n  3) 2n  2
2(2n  1)f + 2
2n  3
2(2n  1)f   cm  
n(2n  3)
2n  1 cm

 0:
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This implies that
f  nd 
1
2(q) + cm +
n(2n 3)
2n 1 cm
n(2n 3)
2n 1
:
Consider the two periphery agents who are linked. Their incentives require
 (d+ f) + 
1  

1
2
(q)  2n  3
2(2n  1)f   cm

 0;
and hence
f   (q + cm) +
1
2(q
0)  cm
+ 2n 32(2n 1)
:
Thus, [q; (d; f)] is implementable if and only if
n(q + cm)  12(q) + cm + n(2n 3)2n 1 cm
n(2n 3)
2n 1
  (q + cm) +
1
2(q
0)  cm
+ 2n 32(2n 1)
: (A.13)
(a) Note that by taking n to innity, (A.13) coincides with (4). Hence, if (4) holds for
q = 1 with a strict inequality, (A.13) holds for q = 1 for large n. Thus, q0 = 1 for large n.
However, note that
 (q + cm) + 12(q)  cm
+ 2n 32(2n 1)
 fmaxn
for q = 1, and hence we can pick a fee f 0  fmaxn .
(b) If (4) fails for q = 1 with a strict inequality, then (A.13) fails for q = 1 for large
n. Then, for large n, both constraints are binding for the second-best allocations. Since
the two conditions, (A.13) and (9), coincide at the limit, the convergence follows. Now,
suppose that (4) holds for q = 1 with an equality. Then both fmaxn and f
min
n converge to
the same limit as f 0. 
Now, the benet of forming this new link per period is then less than
 cl + 1
2
j(qn) (q0)j+
1
2(2n  1)f +
2n  2
2(2n  1) jf

n   f 0j   cl + T (n):
However, Claim 2 implies that we can choose f 0 such that T (n)! 0 as n goes to innity.
Finally, since the contract is given by q = qn, d = qn + cm and f = fn, and since
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fn  fmaxgn , we have
 (qn + cm) +
1
2
(qn)  cm 

n  1
2n  1 + 

fn:
Thus, for a leaf agent to sever a link and to receive no trade, since cl  1=2(qn + cm),
the gain per period is less than
 

1
2
(qn)  cm  
n  1
2n  1f

n   cl

 0:

44
